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I. “DISORDERLY CONDUCT”: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Guest Editors 
Morgan Holmes, Wilfrid Laurier University, 
specializes in social and cultural theories of 
embodiment and sexuality and has published 
widely on issues of knowledge production, 
community identity, and law as they relate to 
intersexuality. Morgan’s monograph, Intersex: 
A Perilous Difference, received honourable 
mention for the 2010 Canadian Women’s 
Studies Association Annual Book Award. 
 
Shannon Dea, University of Waterloo, 
specializes in the history of philosophy—
especially rationalist and pragmatist meta-
physics. She also works on the philosophical 
and historical underpinnings of biological sex 
taxonomies. Shannon is a member of UW’s 
Women’s Studies Board, and regularly gives 
public presentations and interviews on matters 
relating to gender and equity. 
 
 
The special topic cluster in this issue 
of Atlantis brings together scholars from a 
range of disciplines and career stages to 
explore and problematize the clinical de-
ployment of the language of “disorder.” Since 
the publication of Michel Foucault’s Birth of the 
Clinic, researchers from across the humanities 
and social sciences have argued that medical 
practices and discourses belong not simply to 
the realm of health care, but also to the realm of 
governance. In a governance model, citizens/ 
subjects are taken to be responsible not only 
for their own well-being, but also, and 
perhaps more crucially, for managing their 
bodies and their behaviours in ways that 
promote and maximize the civic health of the 
larger population. Bodies and behaviours are, 
therefore, measured, categorized, and sub-
jected to a variety of quality assurance pro-
cedures employing diagnostic and other 
regulatory technologies. In simultaneous counter- 
stream with critiques of medicine’s social 
ordering function, however, clinicians are in-
creasingly deploying the language of disorder to 
describe a variety of human conditions that 
challenge the idealized, civic body. Clinical 
language no longer speaks of “madness,” but 
instead of a variety of personality and 
relationship disorders: a whole host of diverse 
bodily functions is contained under the rubric 
of “metabolic disorders”; divergent and 
disparate modes of interaction are drawn to-
gether under the umbrellas of “autism spectrum 
disorder” and “pervasive development disorder”; 
and individuals previously apprehended as 
inter-sexed are now diagnosed with “disorders 
of sexual development.” The rhetoric of disorder 
not only conflates quite disparate conditions, 
but also serves to regulate the social body by 
stigmatizing the “disordered” body and thus 
defining and idealizing the “well-ordered” one. 
In 2009, we developed and hosted 
“Disorderly Conduct,” an international con-
ference jointly sponsored by Wilfrid Laurier 
University and the University of Waterloo, 
both in Waterloo, Ontario. The conference 
mandate was twofold in encouraging the 
exploration of the deployment of the language 
of disorder, especially in clinical contexts, but 
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also in allowing scholars from more normative 
fields, such as health studies, to engage in a 
dialogue across traditional and critical per-
spectives. To fulfill this mandate, we wel-
comed work from inter- and cross-disciplinary 
perspectives developed by internationally 
located scholars. Papers delivered over the 
three days of the conference came from 
across the humanities, social and health 
sciences, from disciplines including philosophy, 
literary and film studies, psychology, health 
studies and gerontology, critical disability 
studies, women’s and gender studies, 
sociology, and cultural studies.  
The conference opened with a keynote 
address by Steven Angelides (currently at 
Macquarie University, Australia), the author of 
A History of Bisexuality (2001). Two other 
keynote speakers who helped to frame the 
conference themes also brought international 
scope and perspective to the event. Robert 
McRuer, a distinguished disability studies 
scholar from George Washington University 
and author of Crip Theory (2006), delivered a 
vibrant paper on the place of disavowed 
bodies in the films of Pedro Almodóvar. 
Katrina Roen, noted queer theorist from Oslo 
University, Norway, who has published ex-
tensively on issues related to gender, sexuality, 
and embodiment, delivered the closing 
address, which drew our attention to expanded 
purviews for the medical management of 
transgendered youth in Norway. We are very 
pleased that Dr. Angelides was able to develop 
a version of his opening keynote to serve as 
the lead paper in this collection and are 
fortunate, indeed, that the same concepts 
that launched the thematic explorations of the 
three-day conference are available for readers 
of this issue of Atlantis.  
After the conference, we invited the 
roughly two dozen participating scholars to 
submit their articles for consideration in this 
special issue of Atlantis. The submitted articles 
were blind-refereed by international scholars 
from an array of disciplines. The essays in 
this resulting special topic cluster all contribute 
to the development of a reassessed per-
spective that refuses the traditional disavowal 
of “disorder.” 
The theoretical underpinnings of the 
conference mandate—which expanded the 
main Foucaultian point outward—were derived 
from the interdisciplinary field of critical 
disability studies, in which three key texts 
serve as critical departure points for the 
questioning of “disorder” as a neutral and 
objective statement of clinical or diagnostic fact. 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s Extraordinary 
Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American 
Literature and Culture (1997) has given to 
studies of embodiment (including disability, 
sexuality, and psychological concerns) the 
language of “the normate.” Garland-Thomson 
argues that the normate fantasy of human 
being—the idealized, atomized, rationalized, 
and radically individualized body—devalues 
the frailty, disability and dependency that 
mark and characterize most human lives and 
relationships. Eric Parens’s and Adrienne 
Asch’s landmark collection Prenatal Testing 
and Disability Rights (2000) critically examines 
a variety of reproductive technologies, not as 
means through which would-be parents exer-
cise more choice but as a set of ideologically 
linked technologies aimed at quality control of 
the “products of fertilization.” The language of 
“disorder” in the prenatal testing context is 
clearly to be refused, but Parens and Asch 
and the disability studies scholars included in 
the collection ask us to consider what we lose 
(the full spectrum of human frailty) and what 
we promote (prejudice, fear, economic value 
of humans, discrimination, etc.) when we 
seek to do away with disorder. Finally, taking 
aim at contemporary psychiatric practice and 
capitalist investments in a compliant work-
force, Carl Elliott’s Better Than Well: American 
Medicine Meets the American Dream (2003) 
reflects critically on the assertion that a variety 
of mood “disorders” are purely biological and 
chemically manageable phenomena rather 
than valuable indicators of social conditions that 
produce suffering. 
These texts are touchstones for a 
new generation of interdisciplinary scholars 
who work in the intellectual space where 
disability studies intersect with such diverse 
areas as queer theory, feminist theories of 
embodiment, post-structuralist ethics, and the 
burgeoning fields of trans and intersex studies. 
As must be the case in deciding to publish 
only a selection of papers from the conference 
rather than the full proceedings, the full range 
of questions and concerns covered by the 
papers presented cannot be made available 
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here; however, we are fortunate to have six 
papers that reflect a range of theoretical 
concerns related to embodied and mental 
states that have been problematized as 
“disordered,” and which speak back to that 
categorization to rethink the too easy 
presuppositions that order is the opposite of 
disorder, that disorder is necessarily an 
undesirable state, and that we ought to be 
seeking to cure all that is messy or unruly 
about the full range of human experiences 
within and of both body and mind. 
 
Embodied Disorder 
The first two essays collected in this 
special topic cluster of Atlantis—those by 
Steven Angelides and Lisa Dias—speak 
specifically to embodied rather than cognitive 
“difference.” These papers break new ground in 
promoting a challenge to the “normate” dy-
namic: i.e., the fantasy of an idealized human 
being—atomized, rationalized, and radically 
individualized. As explained by Garland- 
Thomson, the idealized normate devalues the 
actual everyday experiences of most embodied 
subjects because most lives are marked by 
the frailty and inter-dependency of human 
relationships, and by disability that can be more 
or less permanent, appearing perhaps at birth, 
perhaps as a result of an accident, or per-
haps as a consequence of aging. Angelides and 
Dias break with normative assumptions and 
rules governing the common presuppositions 
that guide traditional, modernist approaches; 
their essays thus move us toward egress 
points that also promise new intellectual and 
political congress for the development of 
coalitional and fluid understandings of bodies 
in relation both/simultaneously to particular and 
proliferating contexts, communities, and coalitions. 
Angelides and Dias each challenge the normate 
and its reified dualism of order/ health versus 
disorder/disease.  
Each of these two essays builds on 
the ideas of resistance and cooperation to 
play on a more free(ing) sense of disorder: that 
of creating a ruckus, of forming a protestation to 
clear new space for recognition of the viability 
and utility of disorder. In making a ruckus—or 
engaging in a little disorderly conduct—to 
interrogate the biomedical assertion of disorders 
as problems, these essays engage the task 
of interrogating what Margaret Shildrick has 
identified as the two main stumbling blocks of 
contemporary health care, particularly—though, 
for our purposes, not exclusively—in women’s 
health care: first, the binary division of illness 
and wellness, of bodies female and male, and 
of power vested in the physician and in the 
patient; second, the idea that each of us has/ 
is an autonomous self-owned body (Shildrick 
2009, 294). These essays thus build on the 
argument developed by Tanya Titchkosky, 
who observes that, in the hegemonic systems 
of healthcare and education, atypical bodies 
must be made to function according to the 
“idealized normal body” (Titchkosky 2003, 96), 
that is, the body that is expected/demanded, 
rather than the multiplicity of bodies that exist.  
Angelides’s paper begins by drawing 
our attention to the manner in which the concept 
of order—which literally organizes Western 
thought and behaviour—has been relatively 
uninterrogated, perhaps even ignored entirely. 
Angelides argues that, in a context in which 
disorder is so often taken as an obvious 
problem, this neglect of consideration re-
garding order is all the more troubling. As a 
fascinating point of departure, Angelides 
notes that complexity and heterogeneity are 
already implied within the concept of order, 
for if things were actually self-same and 
undifferentiated, there would be no need to 
give an order, pattern, or sequence to them. 
Indeed, he argues that it is only because 
difference is always already there that the act 
of ordering becomes necessary. So it is that 
Angelides first interrogates the all-too-common 
presupposition that order and disorder stand in 
opposition to each other, with order granted the 
privileged state of primacy—as though there 
were no concerted effort required to produce 
order. In short, rather than assessing order as 
a noun denoting a thing, Angelides directs us 
to consider order as a verb, that is, as a 
purposeful activity that perpetually repeats, 
and thus belies, the assertion that order 
“figure[s] as the foundation of all meaning.” 
The essays in this collection that take up 
specific questions of embodied experiences 
that have been cast in simple terms as 
“disordered” (in the ways that we think and/or 
perceive, as disabled in our movements 
and/or senses, as aged and/or suffering in 
particularly gendered modes) draw our 
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attention as readers to ordering as an 
imperative of power, but also to the idea of 
“disorder” as part and parcel of the way that 
any of us brings a sense of self into line with 
larger social patterns. In short, order and 
disorder function not truly at odds with each 
other, but in symbiotic fashion. As in the 
classically Derridean deconstructive sense laid 
out in the famous essay “Structure, Sign and 
Play,” binary structures are interdependent 
and each relies on its supposed opposite to 
provide the framework for its meaning.  
Dias’s paper examines order and 
disorder as these concepts and activities 
relate to a culturally specific mode of under-
standing a particularly gendered experience 
of embodied emotion: agonias. In addition to 
providing a strong review of the literature 
regarding agonias, Dias’s paper draws our 
attention as readers to feminist and decon-
structive refusals of the split of body and 
emotion, and provides a compelling account of 
the manner in which particular cultural mean-
ings can resonate in and through the body. 
Moreover, Dias argues for an account of 
embodied emotion as a form of practice that 
not only articulates from the given but can 
also provide a means of resistance, for 
example, to problems in marriage and/or to 
experiences of domestic violence. In its 
consideration of the value of a culturally 
meaningful affect such as agonias, Dias’s 
work raises a specifically feminist caution that 
these kinds of attitudes/ behaviours—precisely 
because they make sense within a specific 
cultural context—are not only potential points of 
resistance, but are simultaneously reproducing 
the social structures of local(ized) suffering. 
This is a theme that re-emerges very strongly 
in two other contributions in this issue: those 
by Ross, and by Lovrod and Ross. 
 
Psychic Disorder 
The remaining four articles in this 
cluster centre on issues within the context of 
psychology and psychiatry. It is no surprise 
that a number of papers presented at the 
Disorderly Conduct conference—these four 
among them—concerned particularly the 
psychological/psychiatric deployments of the 
concept of disorder. Critiques of the very 
notion of disorder first emerged in the mental 
health context, partially owing to the radical 
work of such anti-psychiatry pioneers as 
Michel Foucault, Thomas Szasz, and R.D. 
Laing, and also because moderate clinicians, 
scholars, and the general public incline less 
toward realism and essentialism in the case 
of psychological diagnoses than in the case 
of physical ones. Put simply, there is less 
room for debate about whether a person 
really has a broken leg or cholera than about 
whether she has a psychological disorder. 
This is a function both of the hiddenness of the 
psyche and of the historically contingent 
character of psychiatric disorders. Thomas 
Szasz famously numbered hysteria and 
drapetomania—American slaves’ pathological 
tendency to try to escape from slavery—
among the psychiatric disorders widely 
diagnosed in the nineteenth century but since 
then rejected as social constructions. In the 
century just past, psychiatry was likewise 
divided over such diagnoses as alcoholism, 
homosexuality, and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD). And, of course, feminist 
scholars are well aware of the gender bias 
that lurks behind such typically female 
diagnoses as Borderline Personality Disorder. 
Still, the number of diagnosable psychiatric 
conditions has grown apace. In the forty 
years between the first and fourth editions of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM), the number of 
mental disorders catalogued there swelled 
from 106 to 297.  
Given all of this, it is perhaps no 
surprise that many clinicians incline less toward 
dogmatism and essentialism about psychiatric 
diagnoses than toward a deflationary and 
pragmatic understanding of the DSM as a 
“patchwork of scientific data, cultural values, 
political compromises, and material for making 
insurance claims” (Marecek and Hare-Mustin 
2008, 78). This pragmatism opened the way 
for critiques of the very notion of disorder 
earlier in the mental health context than in 
medicine generally. However, it also made 
the relevant conceptual analysis a slippery 
business, indeed. The first DSM definition of 
“mental disorder” occurred in the DSM-III 
(1980), which characterized mental disorder as 
“a clinically significant behavioural or psycho-
logical syndrome or pattern that occurs in an 
 6  www.msvu.ca/atlantis ■□    35.2, 2011  
individual and that is typically associated with 
either a painful symptom (distress) or impair-
ment in one or more important areas of 
functioning (disability). In addition, there is an 
inference that there is a behavioural, psycho-
logical, or biological dysfunction, and that the 
disturbance is not only in the relationship 
between the individual and society” (Spitzer 
1980, 6) This definition, however, produced 
controversy, especially over the false positives 
that the definition failed to exclude and its 
pathologisation of socially unacceptable 
variations. Nonetheless, the DSM-IV retains 
the definition, even though the editors note 
that, in strictness, there is no operational 
definition of “mental disorder,” or indeed of 
“disorder” generally (DSM-IV, xxi). 
One of the most fraught matters in the 
defining problem has been the tension between 
“disorder” as a normative sociopolitical term 
and as a (more or less) descriptive bio-
medical term. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most 
influential candidate definition to date among 
psychiatrists, Wakefield’s “Harmful Dysfunction” 
(HD) account, offers a hybrid of these two 
positions, defining “disorder” as (roughly and 
readily) a biomedical dysfunction that does 
sociopolitical harm to the individual with the 
dysfunction (Bolton 2008; Wakefield 2001). 
With the DSM-V imminent, a revision to the 
definition of “mental disorder” is on the table. 
While the jury is still out on what the new 
definition will be, there is reason to expect 
that it will be a hybrid, like Wakefield’s HD. It 
is not at all clear, however, what the con-
sequences will be of making explicit in the 
DSM-V the sociopolitical normalizing function 
of the very notion of disorder. On the one 
hand, foregrounding this aspect of disorder 
may open up a space in which clinicians, 
patients and others—citizens, families, scholars 
and activists, among them—can consider 
sociopolitical rather than clinical solutions to 
sociopolitical problems. However, by codifying 
the normalizing work that the concept of 
disorder does within the DSM-V, we risk 
valorizing that work—accepting it as a given, 
rather than as a force to be resisted. The third 
through sixth articles in this special issue are 
oriented around precisely these matters. 
The first of these is Hilary Clark’s 
“Complicating Disorder: The Play of Inter-
pretation and Resistance in Melanie Klein’s 
Narrative of a Child Analysis.” Drawing on 
evidence from Melanie Klein’s account of her 
1941 psychoanalysis of Richard, a ten-year-
old boy, Clark problematizes the frequent 
accusation that Freudian analysis is normal-
izing. Clark concedes that the psychoanalyst’s 
goal is to “bring about a normalizing cure,” 
and that (contra the optimism of scholar/ 
analysts such as Julia Kristeva and Luce 
Irigaray) psycho-analysis as a practice retains 
and reinforces the distinction between the 
“normal” and the “pathological.” However, in 
Clark’s view this is only part of the story. If 
psychoanalysis as a disciplinary practice re-
tains normalizing boundaries, the emotional 
dynamics of actual analysis complicate these 
boundaries, and in so doing, complicate the 
order/disorder dichotomy. Clark traces this 
“complication” through psychoanalyst Mrs. 
K’s often fraught analysis of Richard and 
through Klein’s later authorial revisiting of the 
analysis. For Clark, Klein’s memoir reveals 
that, at its core, psychoanalysis is constituted 
by an endless play of resistance and counter-
resistance, a play that can make each 
participant in the process—analyst, analysand, 
author, and reader—feel (in the words of 
Jacqueline Rose) like “a fool and a fantast” 
(Rose 1993). In analysis and in reading about 
analysis, Clark concludes, “the meaning of 
disorder could not be more ambiguous.”  
For Marie Lovrod and Lynda Ross, the 
language of disorder accompanies an em-
phasis upon individual treatment that effaces 
the real mechanisms behind psychiatric diag-
noses. Against the background of the dramatic 
in-crease in recent years in therapeutic inter-
ventions of all types, Lovrod and Ross caution 
that treating social problems therapeutically 
can distract attention from the root social and 
material causes of these problems. Their article 
“Post Trauma: Medicalization and Damage to 
Social Reform” considers the diagnosis of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a 
case in point, arguing that PTSD in its 
medicalized format neglects social ills that it 
cannot engage or resolve. Detailing the high 
correlation of PTSD with violence, poverty, 
and war, Lovrod and Ross warn that normative 
diagnostic practices may be implicated in the 
social operations of violence, rather than 
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disrupting them. Trauma may constitute a 
normal adaptation to violence. However, the 
very idea of a normal response to violence 
may reinforce violent behaviour as itself 
normal, and therefore as something to be 
accepted rather than prevented. Thus, whether 
viewed as a disorder or an adaptation, PTSD 
seems to reproduce the social order. According 
to Lovrod and Ross, this is a particular problem 
for women, who are systematically exposed 
to violence—especially in war-torn and de-
veloping countries. It is ending this violence, 
not psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, that 
would effect the greatest reduction in PTSD 
diagnoses among women. However, ending 
violence against women would also threaten 
larger systems of gender-based socio-economic 
power. Casting PTSD as a social problem 
requiring individual treatment rather than a 
wider social problem requiring broad social 
change obviates the need to challenge this 
socio-economic hegemony. Thus, argue 
Lovrod and Ross, the medicalized attitude 
towards trauma as an individual emotional 
problem obscures both the larger systems 
that create the possibility of trauma and the 
socio-political action necessary to prevent the 
vast majority of PTSD cases. Moreover, they 
argue, popular culture’s uptake of terms like 
“trauma” and “PTSD” sanitize them, evacuating 
them of any reference to gender or the socio-
economic-political conditions that make trauma 
possible. On the whole then, the authors 
conclude, the diagnosis of PTSD has globally 
produced “professionalization projects and 
political disengagements that may serve some 
individuals in the short term but cannot serve 
communities or broader collaborative interests 
in the longer term.”  
Ross further pursues these themes in 
her “Attachment ‘Disorders’: Capitalizing on 
Misfortune.” Here, Ross turns her attention to 
Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD) to ask 
what the implications are of treating as 
disordered conduct that is the direct result of 
the socio-economic-political environment in 
which people live. With RAD as with PTSD, in 
Ross’s view, clinicians focusing on emotional 
deficits wrongly draws their attention away 
from the context in which the “disorder” 
exists. While Ross acknowledges that RAD 
can have devastating consequences for 
children, she argues that engagements of RAD 
should focus more centrally on the socio-
economic-political realities that serve to 
create relationship problems in the first place. 
For children exposed to violence or negligence, 
argues Ross, RAD could be adaptive. And, 
as she observes, the DSM is explicit that 
disorders constitute dysfunctions in individuals, 
not normal responses to events or contexts. 
However, in a society intolerant of difference, it 
is all too easy, Ross maintains, to misrepresent 
adaptive responses as pathological. The 
medicalization of attachment disorders, she 
concludes, “wipes away” the implications of 
poverty and intolerance, disordering individual 
behaviours rather than underwriting badly 
needed economic and social reform. 
Our final psychiatrically oriented con-
tribution in this issue is less concerned with 
psychiatrists and their diagnoses than it is 
with the advocacy that follows such diagnoses. 
In “Representing Autism: a Sociological 
Examination of Autism Advocacy,” Anne 
McGuire offers a trenchant analysis of dis-
cursive practices surrounding autism advocacy 
through an examination of two recent high 
profile autism awareness campaigns—Autism 
Speaks’ “Learn the Signs” campaign and the 
New York University Child Study Center’s 
“Ransom Note” campaign. McGuire argues 
that a careful scrutiny of these campaigns helps 
to reveal some of the ways in which power 
relations structure contemporary autism ad-
vocacy. She begins by providing careful detail 
about the “Learn the Signs” campaign. McGuire 
argues that the understanding of autism 
discernible in the campaign is one that “works 
to discursively ‘split’ the autistic body in two, 
conceptually separating what autism is from 
who autism is”—separating autism as a dis-
order one has from the person who is autistic. 
According to McGuire, this way of delimiting 
the disorder of autism from the standard 
social order not only removes any possibility 
for conceiving of autism as a viable way of 
being in the world, but also brings with it an 
all-too-real risk of violence. Indeed, the 
“Ransom Note” campaign makes this risk 
explicit. The posters and billboards in the 
campaign literalize the bifurcation between 
autism and the autistic person that McGuire 
identifies, casting autism as a kidnapper who 
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has taken—or may yet take—one’s child. The 
campaign thus seems to encourage a violent 
reaction against autism by protective parents. 
McGuire sketches one tragic case in which a 
parent reacted to autism in just such a way: 
Dr. Karen McCaron’s 2006 murder of her 
autistic daughter. In her confession, McCaron 
explained that she was trying to kill autism 
and to save her daughter. McGuire argues 
that the reification of autism as a thing—as a 
disorder—is precisely what makes possible 
such an act. She concludes her article with a 
plea that we “begin to critically engage with 
advocacy work as a political project laden 
with complex and risky power relations.” It is 
only in so doing, argues McGuire, that we can 
begin to tell a different story about autism, 
one that regards autistic people as just that 
—people. 
It is no exaggeration to say that 
everyone involved in the “Disorderly Conduct” 
conference is committed in just this way to 
telling new kinds of stories. We are delighted 
to share a few of these stories with you in this 
issue of Atlantis. 
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